University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2018

Altering Time: The Effect Of Feedback Frequency On Employee
Behavior
Nate Waddoups
University of South Carolina

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons

Recommended Citation
Waddoups, N.(2018). Altering Time: The Effect Of Feedback Frequency On Employee Behavior. (Doctoral
dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/4630

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

ALTERING TIME: THE EFFECT OF FEEDBACK FREQUENCY
ON EMPLOYEE BEHAVIOR
by
Nate Waddoups
Bachelor of Science
Brigham Young University, 2010
Master of Accountancy
Brigham Young University, 2010

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Business Administration
The Darla Moore School of Business
University of South Carolina
2018
Accepted by:
Andrew Newman, Major Professor
Scott Jackson, Committee Member
Marlys Lipe, Committee Member
Bryan Stikeleather, Committee Member
Ivo Tafkov, Committee Member
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School

© Copyright by Nate Waddoups, 2018
All Rights Reserved.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I greatly appreciate the guidance and support of my dissertation chair, Andrew
Newman, and dissertation committee members, Scott Jackson, Marlys Lipe, Bryan
Stikeleather, and Ivo Tafkov. I thank Jeremy Douthit, Michael Majerczyk, Rachel Martin,
Chad Simon and the workshop participants at University of Denver, University of South
Carolina, and Utah State University for their helpful comments and suggestions. I
gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Institute of Management
Accountants Research Foundation.

iii

ABSTRACT
Advances in technology have made it possible for employers to provide
performance feedback to employees on a more frequent basis. This study investigates
how different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ perceptions of time and
subsequently how these altered perceptions influence employee productivity. I predict
and find that feedback frequency alters the way employees break up or segment their
work time—a process that I refer to as feedback-driven time segmenting. Ultimately I
find that this process causes feedback frequency to have opposing effects on employee
productivity. Specifically employees who receive more frequent feedback find fewer task
efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback. This finding represents
an unintended cost of increasing feedback frequency—it can lead employees to be less
likely to discover new and better ways of completing their work. However, I also find
that employees who receive more frequent feedback work harder, if less efficiently, than
employees who receive less frequent feedback. By examining both how hard employees
work and how smart (i.e., efficiently) they work my study provides enhanced insight into
the costs and benefits of increasing feedback frequency. As such, it helps managerial
accountants fulfill one of their primary roles, understanding how performance
information influences employee behavior.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Feedback frequency refers to how often managers decide to provide their
employees with performance information over a given period of time (e.g., daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly, etc.). Recent technological advances have made it feasible for
employers to provide more frequent performance feedback to their employees, and
employers such as Amazon, Walmart, and General Electric are beginning to do so (Gillett
2016; Darrow 2017; Dignan 2017). However, it remains unclear whether employers
should do so, in part because the effects of providing more frequent performance
feedback are not well-documented (Andiola 2014). As such, I investigate how providing
more frequent performance feedback affects employee behavior. In particular, I focus on
two behaviors that are critical to determining employee performance, namely, (i) the
propensity of employees to seek out new task efficiencies and (ii) the provision of
productive effort.
Employees can increase productivity by finding new and better ways to complete
work tasks (discovering task efficiencies) or by working harder using what they know
(increasing productive effort). For example, employees working on a production task in a
factory could seek out and experiment with different ways to arrange machinery so as to
complete their work more efficiently or they could simply exert more effort using the
current setup (Benjaafar et al. 2002; Schulz 2014). As another example, knowledge
workers might adopt, modify, or create new software programs to increase their
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efficiency or they may work harder using their current technology (Pentilla 2006; Myers
et al. 2016).
Surveys show that CEOs frequently list the discovery of task efficiencies as one
of their top management challenges (Conference Board 2015; 2016; Sturt and Rogers
2016). Employees can find it difficult to allocate effort away from their trusted,
conventional work approaches towards the uncertain process of discovering new and
better ways of getting work done. While a substantial amount of accounting research has
examined how feedback influences employee effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; 2013;
Newman and Tafkov 2014), little is known about how feedback influences the discovery
of task efficiencies. This study expands our knowledge in this area by investigating how
feedback frequency influences employee behavior in an environment in which employees
must decide how to allocate their effort between getting work done and looking for better
ways to get work done (i.e., looking for task efficiencies). As such, it helps managerial
accountants fulfill one of their primary roles, understanding how performance
information influences employee behavior (Hannan et al. 2013).
I predict that providing more frequent performance feedback to employees has
two opposing effects. First, I predict that it imposes a cost in that it decreases employees’
propensity to seek out task efficiencies. Second, I predict that it conveys a benefit in that
it increases employees’ level of productive effort. In order to make these predictions, I
draw upon research related to the psychology of time (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999;
Grondin 2010). This research indicates that although physical time is an objective
measure, how time is perceived and categorized is often subjective and malleable (e.g.,
Green 1995; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999; Hollander et al. 2005; Moran 2017). Based upon
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this research, I develop theory that suggests that employees with the same work time
horizon will create and focus on different sized time blocks or segments depending upon
the frequency with which they receive feedback. For example, although one employee
may view a year time horizon as twelve separate month-long segments, another employee
may view the same time horizon as two six-month long segments. I expect that
employees who receive more frequent feedback will create smaller time segments than
those who receive less frequent feedback. I predict that this behavior—which I label
feedback-driven time segmenting—affects employees in two ways. First, employees who
create smaller time segments will perceive that they do not have time to explore and thus
they will find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive feedback less
frequently. Second, employees with smaller time segments will feel a sense of urgency to
produce and this will cause them to exert greater productive effort than employees who
receive feedback less frequently.
I test my predictions using an experiment in which participants assume the role of
an employee whose job consists of finding how many times a “search letter” from the
alphabet appears within a corresponding box of letters (adapted from Webb et al. 2013).
Employees perform this letter-search task in an environment in which they can increase
their productivity both by increasing their productive effort and by finding task
efficiencies. The conventional approach for completing the task is to scan the rows and
columns of the boxes and count the number of times the search letter appears. However,
the task contains six hidden task efficiencies that can be discovered if employees are
willing to depart from the conventional approach and instead spend time completing a
decoding task that reveals the efficiencies. The task efficiencies include patterns in the
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letters and boxes that make finding the number of times a letter appears much easier and
quicker. Although participants are informed that implementing an efficiency is faster than
the conventional approach, they are unaware of how long it will take to find the
efficiencies and how beneficial the efficiencies will be, making it difficult for them to
determine ex ante whether or not they should abandon the conventional approach. Within
this setting, I manipulate how frequently participants receive performance feedback at
two levels. In the More Frequent (Less Frequent) condition participants receive
performance reports six times (two times) during an 18-minute work period. 1
Consistent with my predictions, I find that employees who receive more frequent
feedback find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback.
I also find that employees exert more productive effort when feedback is provided more
frequently. Thus, my experimental results document the opposing effects of providing
more frequent performance feedback on two key determinants of employee performance.
Further, consistent with my theory, analysis of responses to a post-experimental
questionnaire suggest that employees who receive more frequent performance feedback
create and focus on smaller time segments than employees who receive less frequent
feedback even though both sets of employees have the same amount of time to complete
the task. Mediation analysis suggests that time segmenting mediates the relationships
between both feedback frequency and productive effort and feedback frequency and the
discovery of task efficiencies.

1

As discussed further in the method section, I investigate the effects of feedback frequency in an
environment in which pay is not tied to the feedback employees receive. I do so in order to illustrate that
feedback can have important consequences on employee behavior even when it does not influence
compensation.
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The results of my research contribute to both theory and practice. My study builds
new feedback theory by introducing the notion of feedback-driven time segmenting and
providing initial evidence in favor of this theory. Specifically my study shows that
different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ mental time segmenting processes.
Subsequently, I demonstrate that altering these mental processes can have important
consequences on employee behavior. My study also contributes to theory and practice by
examining the individual determinants of productivity, as opposed to simply looking at
overall productivity. Examining individual determinants allows me to provide a more
nuanced view of how feedback frequency affects performance. In so doing I provide a
clearer picture of the costs and benefits of an organizational decision, which is a
fundamental role of accounting (Balakrishnan et al. 2009).
A better understanding of how feedback system design choices influence the
individual determinants of productivity will help accountants as they make important
practical decisions regarding their firms’ feedback systems. Although it is commonly
believed that increasing feedback frequency is beneficial and many firms are beginning to
provide feedback more frequently (Lam et al. 2011; Andiola 2014; Gillett 2016), I
demonstrate that doing so can have a detrimental effect on a key determinant of
productivity, efficiency finding. The results from my study suggest that because feedback
frequency does not have unidirectional effects on the individual determinants of
productivity there may be no universal recommendation for the frequency of feedback
accountants should implement. Specifically, my results suggest that firms that want their
employees to seek out potential task efficiencies may be best served by providing
feedback less frequently. However, firms that are content with the efficiency of their
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employees may benefit from increasing feedback frequency thereby increasing
employees’ productive effort.
My study contributes to two different areas of research. First, my study adds to
the stream of literature on feedback frequency (e.g., Kluger and Denisi 1996; Lam et al.
2011; Andiola 2014; Casas-Arce et al. 2017) by developing and testing a novel theory
about how feedback frequency influences psychological processes that drive human
behavior. Further, prior feedback research has provided mixed evidence regarding
frequency’s effect on performance and indicates that a lack of theory has hindered our
understanding in this area (Kluger and Denisi 1996; Casas-Arce et al. 2017). By delving
into the individual determinants of performance, my study provides a more detailed view
that helps explain why feedback frequency has been shown to have mixed effects on
overall performance.
My study also contributes to a new area of research that examines how
management control tools can influence whether employees seek out task efficiencies
(Webb et al. 2013). Webb et al. (2013) examine how financial incentives and challenging
goals influence productive effort and the discovery of task efficiencies. I extend this area
of research by investigating how managerial decisions about the performance feedback
system influence these important determinants of employee productivity.
The next chapter provides background information and develops the hypotheses.
Chapter 3 discusses the experimental method used to test my hypotheses. Chapter 4
reports the results, and Chapter 5 discusses these results and concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES
I examine how feedback frequency influences employee behavior in a setting in
which employees attempting to maximize their individual production must allocate their
effort between using the conventional approach and seeking out task efficiencies.
Research suggests that often in these settings employees must depart from their
conventional approach in order to find efficiencies, and that these departures can cause a
reduction in short-term performance (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002). Prior research also
indicates that constraints often exist in these settings, such as time pressure or limited
mental resources, which can make it difficult for employees to abandon the relatively safe
conventional approach in search of potential efficiencies (Shalley 1991; 1995). Finally,
previous research suggests that, in these settings, simply finding the efficiency does not
lead to increased productivity but that employees must direct productive effort towards
using the efficiency in order to produce (Webb et al. 2013). Thus two employees with the
same knowledge about efficiencies could have differences in output based on how much
productive effort they exerted using those efficiencies. Within this setting, I develop
hypotheses for how feedback frequency will influence the discovery of task efficiencies
and productive effort.
Effect of Feedback Frequency on Discovering Task Efficiencies
Humans have an innate desire to divide or segment the continuous flow of time
into quantifiable blocks in order to help them make sense of their environment and to
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plan their behavior (e.g., Green 1995; Bentley 1996; Zimbardo and Boyd 1999;
Hollander et al. 2005; Friedman 2014; Moran 2017). For example, managers often break
time down into months, quarters, and years in order to make sense of their business
environment and to plan their budgets and business goals (Garrison et al. 2012). I refer to
the cognitive process of separating a continuous time horizon into discrete and
quantifiable blocks of time as time segmenting. 2 Importantly, the mental time segments
that individuals create can exert a strong influence on an individual’s expectations, goals,
and behaviors (Zimbardo and Boyd 1999).
Individuals often use the time between important events when mentally
categorizing a portion of time as a time segment (Green 1995; Bentley 1996; Zimbardo
and Boyd 1999; Grondin 2010). For example, the block of time referred to as a “fiscal
year” is the time between when a company issues the previous-year 10-K (an event) and
the current-year 10-K (another event), and senior managers regularly use a fiscal-year
time segment when planning their behavior and setting important goals at the company
level (e.g., Garrison et al. 2012). 3 At the employee level, receiving performance feedback
is viewed as an important event (Cawley et al. 1998; Hochwarter et al. 2006; Dusterhoff
et al. 2014). This suggests that employees will use the time between feedback events
when mentally breaking up their employee time horizons into discrete, quantifiable
blocks of time that they can use to plan and carry out their work. Thus, I expect that the
frequency with which feedback is provided will alter the length of the mental time

2

Previous research discusses this process, but provides no clear label (e.g., Hollander et al. 2005; Grondin
2010).
3
Note that individuals can be influenced by multiple time segments. For example, a fiscal-year time
segment may span a different period of time (e.g., April – March) than a calendar-year time segment (e.g.,
January – December), but managers’ behaviors and goals are influenced by both fiscal and calendar-year
time segments (Garrison et al. 2012). Identifying whether certain types of time segments will have more or
less influence on behavior than other types of time segments is beyond the scope of this paper.
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segments employees create. Specifically, I expect that when performance feedback is
given closer together, due to being provided on a more frequent basis, employees will
create shorter mental time segments than when feedback is provided on a less frequent
basis. For example, an employee who receives performance feedback on a monthly basis
is more likely to view a one-year work horizon as twelve month-long segments than an
employee who receives performance feedback semi-annually and is consequently more
likely to perceive the same one-year work horizon as two six-month segments. Both
employees have the same time horizon, but feedback frequency alters how they segment
that time.
Although both the number and length of time segments can differ based on
different feedback frequencies (as the example above demonstrates), I expect that it is the
length of the time segments that will ultimately influence employee behavior. Individuals
generally adopt a narrow decision frame and tend to evaluate projects, problems, and
risks one at a time as opposed to in totality (Tversky and Kahneman 1981; Kahneman
and Lovallo 1993; Barberis et al. 2006). In my setting this suggests that instead of
considering all of the time segments holistically, employees will instead focus narrowly
on the current segment. If the current mental time segment is shorter (longer), then
employees will perceive that they have less (more) room for seeking out and finding task
efficiencies. Previous research indicates that having a perception that there is room to
explore is an important precondition for discovering task efficiencies (Manso 2010;
Ederer and Manso 2013). This suggests that employees who receive more frequent
performance feedback and therefore potentially create shorter mental time segments, will
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spend less time looking for and finding task efficiencies than employees who receive less
frequent performance feedback and therefore potentially create longer time segments.
The above discussion leads me to predict that employees who receive more
frequent feedback will find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less
frequent feedback. Although not formally hypothesized, I expect that differences in
mental time segmenting will mediate the relationship between feedback frequency and
efficiency finding.
H1: Employees who receive more frequent feedback will discover fewer task
efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent feedback.
Effect of Feedback Frequency on Productive Effort
Although finding task efficiencies is one way to improve employee productivity,
productivity can also improve when employees work harder using the approaches and
efficiencies they already know (i.e., by increasing productive effort). Importantly, even
within an environment in which efficiencies exist, variation in productive effort can have
important effects on overall productivity (Bonner and Sprinkle 2002; Webb et al. 2013).
For example, consider two employees (Employee A and Employee B) who both know the
same efficiency. If Employee A exerts higher productive effort using that efficiency than
Employee B, then Employee A’s overall productivity will be higher than Employee B’s.
Thus, productive effort is an important determinant of employee performance, even when
efficiencies are present.
As discussed above, my theory of feedback-driven time segmenting suggests that
employees who receive more frequent feedback will create shorter mental time segments
than employees who receive less frequent feedback. I anticipate that this difference in
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time segmenting will alter employees’ productive effort. Specifically, I expect that
employees with shorter time segments will exert greater productive effort than employees
with longer time segments. Consistent with this prediction, prior research indicates that
individuals have higher levels of motivation when they break up larger tasks into smaller
components because they perceive the smaller components as more manageable (Heath et
al. 1999; Amir and Ariely 2008). In my setting, employees who receive more frequent
feedback may view the shorter time segments as more manageable, leading to higher
motivation than employees facing longer time segments. Further, prior research suggests
that when time is perceived to be relatively short, individuals can feel a sense of urgency
that is often missing over longer time segments (Maruping et al. 2015).
In summary I predict that employees who receive more frequent feedback will
exert more productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback.
Although not formally hypothesized, I expect that time segmenting mediates the
relationship between feedback frequency and productive effort.
H2: Employees who receive more frequent feedback will exert greater
productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback.
Because I expect feedback frequency to have opposing effects on two key
determinants of productivity, I make no theoretical prediction about how frequency will
influence overall performance. Further, theory provides no insight into which of the two
determinants is more important to overall performance, likely because it depends upon
the individual situation.
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CHAPTER 3
METHOD
Participants
I recruited 138 participants from business classes at a large public university in
the United States. These students participated in one of 18 experimental sessions. 4, 5 As
participants arrived, they were randomly seated at a computer terminal which had
instructions about the task they would be completing. This task is described in more
detail below.
Experimental Task
Participants complete a letter search task adapted from Webb et al. (2013). As
part of this task, participants receive multiple pages of paper that each contain six boxes
of letters (each box has 7 rows and 19 columns of letters). Participants are tasked with
finding the number of times a specific “search letter” appears within each box (see Figure
3.1). The search letter appears in bold at the top-center of each of the boxes.
After determining the number of times a search letter appears in its corresponding
box, participants enter the response into a production spreadsheet on a computer (see
Figure 3.2). When an incorrect answer is entered, a message box appears notifying the

4

One participant in the last session was dropped from the study leaving a total of 137 participants. This
participant exhibited abnormal behavior consistent with being told about the experiment from peers and
admitted to knowing about the purpose of the experiment in a subsequent discussion.
5
As discussed in more detail in the supplemental analysis section, 65 of these students were used for
testing the primary hypotheses regarding the effect of feedback frequency on finding efficiencies and
productive effort. The remaining 72 participants were used to test whether the primary results were robust
to different types of feedback (relative performance versus individual performance feedback).
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participant that the answer is incorrect. This message box remains for five seconds during
which time the participant is unable to enter answers into the spreadsheet. This five
second delay deters participants from rapidly entering incorrect answers until they find
the correct response. At the side of the production spreadsheet is a timer that notifies
participants of the time remaining until they receive feedback from management.
An important feature of this letter search task is that there is a conventional
approach for completing the task, but it also has hidden shortcuts embedded within it that
can be found if participants are willing to explore outside of the conventional approach.
The conventional approach is to methodically scan the box and count the number of times
a letter appears. While this approach is a reliable method for completing the task, there
are six shortcuts built into the task that make finding the correct answer much more
efficient. To find these shortcuts, participants must be willing to momentarily abandon
the conventional approach and instead choose to explore a folder labeled “Shortcuts.”
Participants are unaware of the exact contents of the shortcuts folder, representing the
uncertainty that often accompanies the search for efficiencies in real work environments.
Unbeknownst to the participants the folder contains six hidden messages that must be
decoded in order to find the shortcuts (one message for each of the six shortcuts). In order
to reveal the hidden message, participants had to decode a series of two-digit numbers
into letters from the alphabet using a decoding key (See Figure 3.3 for a decoding
example).
There are six shortcuts (one for each of the six boxes) and a shortcut once
discovered can be used on each subsequent page. Each shortcut involves a pattern that
allows participants to find correct answers quickly. For example, the shortcut for Box 1
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includes the following sequence (3, 5, 4, 9, 2) repeating itself. That is, the answer to Box
1 on page one is three, on page two it is five, on page three it is four, on page four it is
nine, on page five it is two and then the sequence repeats itself starting on page six. This
same shortcut can be used on each of the twenty pages within the experiment. Thus, a
participant could come up with the correct answer for Box 1 on every page by identifying
this sequence and then simply entering the sequence into the production spreadsheet.
Alternatively, the participant could use the conventional approach (scanning Box 1 and
counting the number of times the search letter appears) to find the correct answer, which
while slower does not require the participant to abandon the conventional approach and
seek out the shortcut. For a complete list of the shortcuts see Figure 3.4.
This task captures key features of the setting of interest. It models an environment
in which participants must make a decision between continuing to do what they have
always done and exploring for potential task efficiencies. Similar to many real world
work environments, in this task the exploration process involves uncertainty about how
long it will take to find an efficiency, whether the employee has the requisite skills to find
an efficiency, and whether an efficiency will be worth the cost of finding it. Further,
consistent with real world environments, in this task searching for efficiencies is
generally harmful to short-term performance because it can require employees to
momentarily abandon their productive conventional approach (Bonner and Sprinkle
2002).
Procedures
Upon entering the lab, participants were seated at workstations that were labeled
as either Employee A, Employee B, or Employee C. As discussed in more detail below
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these labels were used for introductions and performance feedback purposes. After being
seated at the workstations, participants received instructions on their computers that
introduced them to the letter search task. These instructions were also read aloud to the
participants. The instructions indicated that participants would complete a production
task that started with a two-minute practice period and would subsequently be followed
by an eighteen-minute main production period.
After participants finished the practice period, they received instructions about the
upcoming 18-minute production period. The instructions informed the participants that
there were two ways to find the number of times a search letter appeared in a box. The
first way was to use the conventional approach and simply count the number of times the
letter appeared and the second way was to identify shortcuts. 6 The instructions indicated
that six shortcuts could be found (one for each of the six boxes) and that a shortcut, once
discovered, could be used on each subsequent page. Participants were then instructed that
if they chose to look for a shortcut while completing their work they could open a folder
on their desk labeled “Shortcuts.” Participants were informed that this folder contained
details for finding each of the six shortcuts, but otherwise remained unaware of the
folder’s contents. The instructions then indicated that finding shortcuts could take away
valuable time from productively completing boxes, but that using a shortcut would be
much faster than manually counting the number of times a letter appeared. Thus,
participants faced a decision about how to allocate their efforts between a relatively

6

In the real world, employees will have more expertise about the tasks they complete and will have
knowledge and insights about potential task efficiencies. In an abstract lab experiment with a task that they
are not familiar with, participants are unlikely to know that efficiencies may exist unless they are told (i.e.,
they will assume that the experimenter did not design any efficiencies into the task unless they are told
otherwise). Participants in all conditions are informed about the existence of shortcuts.
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reliable strategy of counting letters and a relatively risky strategy that had the potential
for increased efficiency—searching for shortcuts. After learning about the shortcuts
folder, participants took a short questionnaire to measure their intrinsic interest in the
letter search task.
After the short questionnaire, participants were told to assume they worked for a
company named Letter Counting Inc. They were informed that they had been paired with
two other employees who would act as their co-workers throughout the experiment (e.g.,
If they sat at the workstation labeled Employee A, then they were paired with Employee
B and Employee C). They were then told that Letter Counting Inc. would pay them a $10
fixed wage for their work completing boxes. Using a fixed wage allowed me to cleanly
isolate the behavioral effects of feedback frequency by holding economic predictions
about wealth-maximizing behavior constant (Hannan et al. 2013; Tafkov 2013). 7
Next, participants were informed that Letter Counting Inc. would provide them
with performance feedback that indicated how many boxes they had completed as well as
how their performance compared to their co-workers. They were then told how
frequently they would receive feedback and they were provided with more specifics
about what the feedback entailed (discussed in more detail in the “Frequency Conditions”
section below). At this point, participants took a short quiz to test their understanding of
the instructions. After completing the quiz they each introduced themselves by standing
and stating their employee label (Employee A, Employee B, or Employee C), their first
name, and whether or not they were a business major. Each employee had a card on the

7

Further, non-performance based pay is commonly observed in the workplace, enhancing the
generalizability of my study (Hannan et al. 2013). In addition, previous research provides evidence that
fixed wage contracts create a better environment for finding task efficiencies than performance-based
incentives (Amabile 1996; Webb et al. 2013).
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top of their workstation that contained their employee label, which was visible to all other
employees. The introductions were used in order to make the feedback more meaningful
to the participants (Hannan et al. 2013; Tafkov 2013). Following the introductions,
employees began the production period. After completing the production period,
participants completed a post experimental questionnaire. Upon completing the
questionnaire, participants were paid their $10 fixed wage. In total, participants were in
the lab for a little under an hour.
Frequency Conditions
The frequency (Less Frequent vs More Frequent) of feedback was varied between
conditions. Participants in the Less Frequent condition received performance reports two
times during the production period (every nine minutes), whereas participants in the
More Frequent condition received performance reports six times (every three minutes).
This manipulation mirrors the real world in which managers can decide how often to
provide performance feedback over a given period of time (Frederickson et al. 1999).
The information participants received in a performance report can be seen in
Figure 3.5. As Figure 3.5 illustrates, participants received a performance report from
Letter Counting Inc. that indicated the number of boxes they had correctly completed
since they last received feedback (or from the beginning of the production period in the
first feedback instance). These reports also contained relative performance information
that indicated employee rank (1st, 2nd, or 3rd) along with more detailed information about
how many boxes each of the three employees completed since they last received
feedback. I chose to use relative performance information (RPI) because previous
research indicates that this type of feedback is commonly used by firms (Hannan et al.
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2008; 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014; Tafkov 2013; Burgers et al. 2015; Newman et al.
2016). However, because RPI is a particularly salient type of feedback (due to the fact
that it facilitates social comparison), in supplementary analysis I investigate whether my
results are robust to situations in which feedback contains only individual performance
information (i.e., in the absence of RPI).
Dependent Variables
The primary dependent variables of interest were the number of shortcuts
employees found and their productive effort. Participants received credit for finding a
shortcut if they decoded the shortcut message and demonstrated that they understood the
shortcut by using it. Participants demonstrated an understanding of the shortcut if the box
corresponding to the shortcut was completed in less than 10 seconds multiple times. The
amount of time it takes to complete a box and the order in which the boxes were
completed was recorded electronically. The average time for completing a box without
knowledge of a shortcut was 33 seconds. A large reduction in the amount of time it takes
to complete a box, coupled with a completely decoded message, provided strong
evidence that a shortcut had been identified. Next I discuss my measure of productive
effort.
In my setting, employee output is a function of both their productive effort and
the number of shortcuts they find. Thus, to capture productive effort, I measured the total
amount that each employee produced (total output) and divided that amount by one plus
the number of shortcuts discovered (productive effort = total output/(1 + # of shortcuts)). 8

8

By adding one to the number of shortcuts discovered I am able to retain the participants who did not find
any shortcuts. These participants are important to retain as they represent the employees who go about their
work without ever looking for efficiencies. Although these employees do not find any shortcuts they still
exert considerable amounts of productive effort.
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By dividing by one plus the number of shortcuts discovered I was able to control for
productivity gains caused by knowing the shortcuts. In other words, controlling for the
number of shortcuts known allowed for a clearer picture of how hard employees worked,
as opposed to how smart they worked. Consistent with previous research I refer to this
measure as employees’ productivity per shortcut (Webb et al. 2013). 9
Process Measures
My theory suggests that how employees mentally segment time will influence the
number of task efficiencies they find, with those employees who create smaller mental
time segments perceiving that they have less room to find task efficiencies than
employees who create larger time segments. I capture a measure of employees’ time
segmenting process in the post-experiment questionnaire by asking them to respond to
the following question on a seven-point scale: “While working did you think of your
work in terms of:” Participants could respond to this question on a seven point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (three minute chunks) to 7 (an eighteen minute chunk).

9

In the results section I present an alternative measure for productive effort that provides results consistent
with my productivity per shortcut measure.
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FIGURE 3.1: Letter Search Task
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FIGURE 3.2: Production Spreadsheet

21

FIGURE 3.3: Decoding Example
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Box 1: The correct answer for this box follows the following sequence: three five four
nine two repeated.
Box 2: The correct answer for this box is always the number of consecutive G’s in the
top row of the search box.
Box 3: Adding the first two boxes together and subtracting one always provides the
correct answer for this box.
Box 4: The correct answer for this box is equal to the number of X’s in the far right
column of the search box multiplied by the number two.
Box 5: The correct answer for this box follows the following sequence: six eight four one
four repeated.
Box 6: Adding boxes four and five together and subtracting one always provides the
correct answer for this box.

FIGURE 3.4: List of Shortcuts
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FIGURE 3.5: Performance Feedback Screenshot
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 reports the descriptive statistics by Frequency condition. Panel A
contains the mean number of Shortcuts that participants discovered and Panel B includes
the mean Productivity per Shortcut discovered. As discussed above, by controlling for the
number of Shortcuts known, differences in the Productivity per Shortcut between
employees can be attributed to differences in the intensity of the productive effort being
exerted.
As reported in Table 4.1, Panel A employees who received less frequent feedback
found, on average, more than double the amount of Shortcuts than employees who
received more frequent feedback (mean = 1.39 versus 0.66). This pattern of results is
consistent with H1. As reported in Table 4.1, Panel B employees who received more
frequent feedback had, on average, directionally higher amounts of Productivity per
Shortcut than employees who received less frequent feedback (mean = 30.54 versus
22.94). This pattern of results is consistent with H2. Figure 4.1 plots the number of
Shortcuts discovered by condition and the Productivity per Shortcut by condition. Figure
4.1 illustrates that, as expected, feedback frequency appears to have opposing effects on
efficiency finding and productive effort.
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Hypotheses Testing – Feedback Frequency
H1 predicts that employees who receive more frequent feedback will discover
fewer shortcuts than employees who receive less frequent feedback. In order to test my
hypothesis related to efficiency finding, I run an ANOVA with the number of Shortcuts
discovered as the dependent variable and Frequency as the independent variable. 10 The
results of this analysis are presented in Table 4.2, Panel A. As reported in Table 4.2,
Panel A, H1 is supported (F = 3.95, P = 0.03, one-tailed). This result suggests that
increasing feedback frequency has a detrimental effect on employees’ discovery of task
efficiencies.
H2 predicts that employees in the More Frequent condition will have higher
levels of productive effort than employees in the Less Frequent condition. In order to test
H2, I run an ANOVA with Productivity per Shortcut as the dependent variable and
Frequency as the independent variable. As reported in Table 4.2, Panel B, H2 is
supported (F = 6.67, P < 0.01, one-tailed). This results suggests that increasing feedback
frequency helps motivate employees’ productive effort, causing them to increase their
productivity by increasing the intensity of the effort directed towards the conventional
approach and more efficient approaches that have previously been discovered.
As a second measure of productive effort, I run an OLS regression to estimate the
effect of frequency on output while controlling for the number of shortcuts known and
the amount of time spent actually completing boxes (i.e., productive effort duration). By
controlling for productive effort duration in addition to knowledge about shortcuts I am
able to get a clearer picture of the intensity of the effort being employed. Specifically I

10

Non-parametric testing that is robust to violations of normality provide inferentially identical results.
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run the following OLS regression: Total Output = α + β1(Frequency Indicator Variable)
+ β2(Shortcuts Discovered) + β3(Effort Duration) + ε. Further supporting H2, regression
results indicate that frequency has a significantly positive effect on productive effort (β1 =
4.74, P = 0.02, one-tailed, untabulated).
The theory underlying H1 and H2 is that differences in feedback frequency can
lead to differences in how employees categorize or segment time. I capture the length of
participants’ time segments in the post-experiment questionnaire. Specifically, employees
were asked about the length of the chunks of time they focused on while working.
Participants responded to this question using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (three
minute chunks) to 7 (an eighteen minute chunk). Those employees in the More Frequent
condition focused on significantly smaller chunks of time than employees in the Less
Frequent condition (average responses of 1.44 versus 3.91, P < 0.01, one-tailed).
Although all employees have the same work time horizon of 18 minutes, the frequency in
which the feedback is provided appears to alter how employees segment time. Employees
in the More Frequent condition appeared to perceive their 18 minute work horizon as
something approaching six 3-minute segments whereas employees in the Less Frequent
condition appeared to perceive their 18 minute work horizon as something approaching
two 9-minute segments. This result suggests that feedback frequency can alter how
employees segment time. Next, I use mediation analysis (Hayes 2013) to examine
whether this difference in mental time segmenting ultimately influences employee
behavior. 11

11

Results for all mediation analyses are inferentially identical using the Baron and Kenny (1986) approach.

27

I develop a model to test whether Time Segmenting mediates the relationship
between feedback Frequency and the number of Shortcuts employees discover. For a
visual representation of this model see Figure 4.2, Panel A. I compute a 95% bootstrap
confidence interval based on 5,000 bootstrap samples to test whether the indirect path
through Time Segmenting is statistically significant. The 95% confidence interval lies
entirely below zero

(-0.06 to -1.75) indicating that Time Segmenting significantly

mediates the negative effect of feedback Frequency on number of Shortcuts discovered.
This result suggests that increasing feedback frequency can cause employees to create
smaller mental time segments which subsequently leads employees to find fewer task
efficiencies.
Next, I use mediation analysis to test whether Time Segmenting also mediates the
relationship between feedback Frequency and productive effort as measured by
Productivity per Shortcut. For a visual representation of this model see Figure 4.2, Panel
B. Using the same bootstrap technique as above I find that the 95% confidence interval
lies entirely above zero (1.17 to 10.01) indicating that Time Segmenting significantly
mediates the positive relationship between feedback Frequency and Productivity per
Shortcut. This result suggests that although mentally creating smaller time segments can
have a detrimental effect on efficiency finding, it appears to benefit employees’
productive effort. Taken together my results demonstrate that differences in time
segmenting can have important effects on employee behavior.
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Supplementary Analysis
Type of Feedback
Although not the primary focus of the study I also examine different types of
performance feedback (individual feedback and relative performance information (RPI))
for two reasons. The first reason is to test whether my documented results are robust to
different types of feedback. As mentioned in the method section, I chose to use RPI as the
type of feedback that I provided to employees. However, because RPI is a particularly
strong form of feedback that facilitates social comparisons (Hannan et al. 2008; 2013), I
also vary feedback frequency using a relatively weak form of feedback—individual
feedback that simply sums up the number of boxes an employee completed. The second
reason for investigating feedback type is to examine its independent effect on the
discovery of task efficiencies. While previous research has examined how RPI influences
effort (e.g., Hannan et al. 2008, 2013 Tafkov 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014), it has yet
to examine how RPI influences the discovery of task efficiencies.
To test the effects of feedback type I used the same letter search task with
shortcuts described above. I also recruited participants from the same pool of students
and used the same feedback frequency variations as described above (six times versus
two times). The procedures and instructions were identical with one exception—the type
of performance feedback participants received (RPI versus No RPI). As discussed earlier,
participants in the RPI conditions received information about their individual
performance along with information about how their performance compared to two coworkers with whom they had been paired. In the No RPI conditions, participants simply
received a summary of their individual performance, or the number of boxes they had
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completed (see Figure 4.3). Next I present the findings for whether my previous results
are robust to different types of feedback.
Type of Feedback - Results
Table 4.3 reports the descriptive statistics for how feedback frequency affects the
No RPI conditions. Panel A demonstrates that, on average, employees who received more
frequent feedback found fewer than half the number of Shortcuts than employees who
received less frequent feedback (mean = 1.00 versus 2.06). This difference is statistically
significant (p-value = 0.01, one-tailed, untabulated), indicating that increasing feedback
frequency can cause employees to find fewer efficiencies even when the feedback being
provided is relatively inconspicuous (a simple summary of output with no comparative
features). This provides evidence that my results regarding how feedback frequency
influences efficiency finding are robust to different types of feedback. Consistent with
robustness, untabulated analysis indicates that there is no significant interaction between
feedback frequency and feedback type on the number of Shortcuts found (p-value = 0.58,
two-tailed).
Table 4.3, Panel B reports that, on average, employees in the No RPI conditions
who received more frequent feedback had higher levels of Productivity per Shortcut than
employees who received less frequent feedback (mean = 30.07 versus 22.62). This
difference is statistically significant (p-value < 0.01, one-tailed, untabulated). Thus,
increasing feedback frequency appears to lead to higher productive effort even when the
feedback is a simple summary of output. Here again I find that my results are robust to
different types of feedback. Consistent with being robust, untabulated analysis suggests
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that there is no significant interaction between feedback frequency and feedback type on
Productivity per Shortcut (p-value = 0.97, two-tailed).
As mentioned above, previous research has examined how RPI influences effort
(e.g., Hannan et al. 2008; 2013), but it has yet to examine how it affects the discovery of
task efficiencies. Because there is no significant interaction between feedback frequency
and feedback type I collapse across frequency conditions to examine the independent
effect of RPI on the number of Shortcuts found. 12 My results indicate that, on average,
those employees who received RPI found fewer shortcuts than those employees who did
not (mean = 1.03 versus 1.53, p-value = 0.09, two-tailed, untabulated). This suggests that
providing RPI can have a detrimental effect on the number of efficiencies employees
find. Next I discuss potential reasons for this finding.
Previous research and questions about social image concerns in the postexperimental questionnaire provide potential insights into why RPI caused employees to
find fewer efficiencies than individual performance information. Previous social
psychology research suggests that concerns about social image and avoiding social losses
may cause employees to avoid taking risks that could potentially cause them to look bad
to their peers (Loewenstein et al. 1989; Camerer 1998; Lim 2010). In my setting, being
risk averse would mean using the conventional approach as opposed to the riskier option
of seeking out unknown task efficiencies. Thus, it may be the case that providing RPI
heightened employees’ social image concerns, leading them to use a conventional
approach more often than employees who did not receive RPI. In order to test this
explanation, I asked participants in a post-experiment questionnaire several questions

12

Using the full model with the interaction term leads to inferentially identical results.
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about their concerns regarding social image and social losses. Specifically I asked
employees to report on a seven point scale how often they thought about their
performance compared to other participants (Rank Thinking); how nervous or concerned
they were about how well they were performing relative to other participants (Rank
Nervousness); the extent to which thinking about how their performance compared to
other participants interfered with their ability to concentrate on the task (Rank
Interference) and how much they worried about the possibility of performing worse than
other people in the study (Social Loss Concern).
Table 4.4 provides results for the four different questions I asked with regards to
rankings and social losses. As reported in Table 4.4, employees who received RPI had
significantly higher levels of Rank Thinking, Rank Nervousness, Rank Interference, and
Social Loss Concern than employees who did not receive RPI (all p-values < 0.05). 13
These results are consistent with the explanation that RPI can cause employees to worry
about their social image and exhibit risk averse behaviors to avoid social losses.
In summary, supplemental analysis suggests that my documented results
regarding how feedback frequency influences time segmenting, productive effort, and
efficiency finding are robust to different types of feedback. Additionally, I find that
employees who receive RPI find fewer task efficiencies than employees who only receive
individual performance feedback. Next I discuss my results with regards to the relation
between feedback frequency and overall performance.

13

Creating a single social image concern factor using these four questions (eigenvalue = 2.479, percentage
of variance explained = 61.98%) and testing for differences using this factor leads to identical results.
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Overall Performance
Predicting how feedback frequency influences overall performance is challenging
for two reasons: First, my results demonstrate that feedback frequency can have opposing
effects on two key determinants of performance, productive effort and efficiency finding.
Second, theory does not provide insights into which of the two will have a larger effect
on overall performance, likely because it depends upon the individual situation and the
timeline being evaluated. For these reasons I make no formal prediction about how
feedback frequency affects overall output or the total number of boxes completed.
Although I have no formal prediction regarding overall output, observing how
patterns of output vary over time across the frequency conditions can be insightful. For
example, one might expect that employees in the Less Frequent conditions would have
dips in productivity as they seek out efficiencies, followed by bursts in productivity as
efficiencies are discovered. In contrast, employees in the More Frequent conditions
would likely have steady output as they continue working hard using the work
approaches they already know. Figure 4.4 breaks the eighteen-minute production period
into three minute periods of time and plots the average amount of work completed during
each of those three-minute periods by Frequency condition. As Figure 4.4 demonstrates,
the performance of employees who received feedback less frequently seems erratic when
compared to the smoother performance of those employees who received feedback more
frequently.
Interestingly, the erratic behavior of employees in the Less Frequent condition led
to higher levels of average total output than the smoothing behavior of employees in the
More Frequent condition within my experimental setting (48.36 versus 42.85, P = 0.096,
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two-tailed, untabulated). This finding is consistent with the growing notion that firms
would likely benefit from greater tolerance towards employees’ short-term failures and
an increased emphasis on employees’ long-term performance (Manso 2010; Ederer and
Manso 2013). However, caution should be taken when generalizing findings about total
output from my experimental setting to all work settings as the level of benefit derived
from finding efficiencies will likely vary from organization to organization. That is, it
could be the case that in some environments the gains from having employees seek out
efficiencies are not worth the losses in productive effort.
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TABLE 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Means (Standard Errors) for Shortcuts Found
Less Frequent

More Frequent

Average

1.39
(0.29)
n = 33

.66
(0.28)
n = 32

1.03
(0.21)
n = 65

Panel B: Means (Standard Errors) for Productivity Per Shortcut
Less Frequent

More Frequent

Average

22.94
(2.04)
n = 33

30.54
(2.07)
n = 32

26.68
(1.46)
n = 65

Variable Definitions:
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback that includes
RPI every nine minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive
performance feedback that includes RPI every three minutes.

35

TABLE 4.2: Test of Hypothesis H1 and Test of Hypothesis H2
Test of Hypothesis H1
Panel A: Analysis of Variance for Shortcuts Found
Factor

df

Sum of
Squares

F

P-Value a

Frequency

1

8.84

3.95

0.03

Error

63

Test of Hypothesis H2
Panel B: Analysis of Variance for Productivity Per Shortcut

a

Factor

df

Sum of
Squares

F

P-Value a

Frequency

1

938.18

6.67

<0.01

Error

63

Bolded p-values are one-tailed.

Variable Definitions:
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).
Feedback Frequency is a between-subjects manipulated variable: In the Less Frequent
conditions participants receive performance feedback that includes RPI every nine
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback
that includes RPI every three minutes.
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TABLE 4.3: Descriptive Statistics – No RPI Conditions
Panel A: Means (Standard Errors) for Shortcuts Found
Less Frequent

More Frequent

Average

2.06
(0.32)
n = 36

1.00
(0.28)
n = 36

1.53
(0.20)
n = 72

Panel B: Means (Standard Errors) Productivity Per Shortcut
Less Frequent

More Frequent

Average

22.62
(1.96)
n = 36

30.07
(1.96)
n = 36

26.34
(1.38)
n = 72

Variable Definitions:
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback
every three minutes.
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TABLE 4.4: Rank Thinking and Social Loss Aversion Questions
Mean (Standard Error)
No RPI

RPI

3.97
(0.17)
3.53
(0.21)
2.57
(0.19)
4.43
(0.18)

4.51
(0.18)
4.05
(0.22)
3.11
(0.20)
5.15
(0.19)

Rank Thinking
Rank Nervousness
Rank Interference
Social Loss Concern

a

P-Value a
0.02
0.04
0.03
<0.01

Bolded values are one-tailed.

Variable Definitions:
Rank Thinking represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven
point scale: “How often did you think about how your performance compared to the
performance of other participants?” (1 = Never, 4 = Sometimes, 7 = Very Often).
Rank Nervousness represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven
point scale: “How nervous or concerned were you about how well you were
performing relative to other participants?” (1 = Not at all nervous or concerned, 4 =
Somewhat nervous or concerned, 7 = Very nervous or concerned).
Rank Interference represents employees’ responses to the following question on a seven
point scale: “To what extent did thinking about how your performance compared to
those of other participants interfere with your ability to concentrate on the task?” (1 =
Not at all, 4 = To a moderate extent, 7 = To a great extent).
Social Loss Concern represents employees’ responses to the following statement on a
seven point scale: “When I worked on the letter search task, I worried about the
possibility of performing worse than other people in this study.” (1 = Strongly
disagree, 4 = Neither agree nor disagree, 7 = Strongly agree).
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Efficiency Finding

Productive Effort
32
30.54

1.39
Productivity per Shortcut

1.5

Shortcuts

1.3
1.1
0.9
0.7

30
28
26
24

0.66

0.5

22.94

22
Less Frequent More Frequent

Less Frequent More Frequent

FIGURE 4.1: Efficiency Finding and Productive Effort by Condition
Variable Definitions:
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).
In the Less Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine
minutes. In the More Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback
every three minutes.
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Panel A: Shortcuts Discovered Model
α = -2.47
P < 0.01

Time
Segmenting

β = 0.37
P < 0.01

C’ = 0.17
P = 0.72
Feedback
Frequency

Shortcuts
Discovered

Panel B: Productivity per Shortcut Model

α = -2.47
P < 0.01

Feedback
Frequency

Time
Segmenting

C’ = 2.30
P = 0.56

β = -2.15
P = 0.02

Productivity
per Shortcut

FIGURE 4.2: Mediation Model
Variable Definitions:
Feedback Frequency is a between-subjects manipulated variable: In the Less Frequent
conditions participants receive performance feedback every nine minutes. In the More
Frequent conditions participants receive performance feedback every three minutes.
Time Segmenting represents participants responses to the following question: “While
working did you think of your work in terms of:” (1-7) 1 = three minute chunks, 4 =
nine minute chunks, and 7 = an eighteen minute chunk.
Shortcuts refers to the number of shortcuts employees discover.
Productivity per Shortcut refers to the number of boxes employees complete while
controlling for the number of shortcuts known. It is calculated as follows: the number
of boxes completed / (1 + the number of shortcuts known).
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FIGURE 4.3: Performance Feedback Screenshot – No RPI
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Average Output

12
10
8
6
More Frequent
4
2

Less Frequent

1

2

3

4

5

6

Three Minute Interval

FIGURE 4.4: Average Output per Three Minute Time Interval
Variable Definitions:
Average Output represents the average number of boxes completed correctly by
employees during a three minute interval.
In the Less Frequent condition participants receive performance feedback every nine
minutes. In the More Frequent condition participants receive performance feedback
every three minutes.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how feedback frequency
can influence two key determinants of employee productivity—productive effort and the
discovery of task efficiencies. My results demonstrate that employees who receive more
frequent feedback find fewer task efficiencies than employees who receive less frequent
feedback. I also find that employees who receive more frequent feedback exert more
productive effort than employees who receive less frequent feedback. Thus, my
experimental results document the opposing effects of providing more frequent
performance feedback on two key determinants of employee performance. My results
also provide theory confirming evidence for why feedback frequency has these effects.
Specifically, feedback frequency appears to significantly alter how employees segment
their time and mediation analysis suggests that time segmenting mediates the
relationships between both feedback frequency and productive effort and feedback
frequency and the discovery of task efficiencies.
Although not the primary focus of the study, supplementary results indicate that
my predicted effects are robust to different types of feedback, including stronger forms of
feedback such as RPI and weaker forms of feedback such as individual performance
information that simply summarizes an individual’s output. These supplementary results
also indicate that employees who receive RPI find fewer task efficiencies than employees
who only receive individual performance information. Results from the post-
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experimental questionnaire suggest that providing RPI may lead employees to avoid risks
that could lead to social losses.
The results of my study inform both theory and practice. My study builds new
theory related to performance feedback by introducing the notion of feedback-driven time
segmenting and providing initial evidence in favor of this theory. Specifically my study
shows that different feedback frequencies can alter employees’ mental time segmenting
processes. I also demonstrate that feedback-driven time segmenting can have important
consequences on employees’ productive effort and efficiency finding—two key
determinants of employee productivity. Additionally, by examining the individual
determinants of productivity, as opposed to simply looking at overall output, my results
provide a more intricate view of how feedback frequency affects performance. In so
doing I provide enhanced insight into the costs and benefits of an important
organizational decision.
A better understanding of how feedback frequency affects the individual
determinants of employee productivity will help managers who are considering
increasing feedback frequency because of advances in feedback technology. Although
many firms are beginning to provide feedback more frequently (e.g., Gillett 2016;
Darrow 2017; Dignan 2017), I demonstrate that doing so may have the unintended
consequence of reducing the number of task efficiencies employees discover. Thus,
managers who want their employees to seek out potential task efficiencies may be best
served by providing performance feedback less frequently. However, increasing feedback
frequency does appear to motivate higher levels of productive effort, suggesting that
managers who are satisfied with the efficiency of their employees’ work processes may

44

benefit from increasing performance feedback frequency. Taken together these results
suggest that because feedback frequency can have opposing effects on the individual
determinants of productivity there may be no general recommendation for the frequency
of feedback accountants should implement. Instead the decision will depend in part upon
whether managers want more efficiency or more productive effort. Additionally, my
supplemental results regarding feedback type indicate that managers who want their
employees to find more efficiencies may be best served by avoiding RPI and instead
providing individual feedback that does not cause employees to be concerned about
looking bad to their co-workers.
My study contributes to three different areas of research. First, my study
contributes to the stream of literature on feedback frequency (e.g., Kluger and Denisi
1996; Frederickson et al. 1999; Lam et al. 2011; Andiola 2014; Casas-Arce et al. 2017) in
two ways. I add to this literature by developing and testing the theory of feedback-driven
time segmenting and demonstrating how it influences employee behavior. I also
contribute to this literature by documenting the opposing effects of feedback frequency
on two determinants of overall performance. By so doing, my study helps explain why
previous research has found mixed evidence regarding the effect of feedback frequency
on overall performance (e.g., Kluger and Denisi 1996; Casas-Arce et al. 2017).
Second, my study extends the accounting literature on RPI. Previous research in
this area has examined how RPI affects employees’ productive effort (e.g., Hannan et al.
2008; 2013; Newman and Tafkov 2014), but has yet to examine its influence on the
discovery of task efficiencies. While previous research has shown that RPI has a positive
effect on performance in fixed-wage and piece-rate environments (Tafkov 2013), my
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study illustrates that this positive effect may come at the cost of discovering task
efficiencies that could prove useful to the firm in the long run. Third, my study
contributes to a new area of research that examines how managerial controls can
influence productivity in an environment in which employees can improve productivity
by increasing productive effort and by finding task efficiencies (Webb et al. 2013). I
build upon Webb et al. (2013), who focus on financial incentives and goals, by
examining the effects of different feedback frequencies and types within this important
setting.
My study suggests several avenues for future research. While this study focuses
on the effects of feedback frequency on employee time segmenting, future research could
investigate whether other organizational factors interact with feedback frequency to affect
or independently affect time segmenting. For example, prior feedback research has
examined both formal feedback and informal feedback (Dezoort et al. 2006; Kadous et al.
2013; Andiola 2014). In my study feedback was relatively formal as participants knew
when they would receive feedback and the feedback came in the form of a performance
report. In certain circumstances managers or other colleagues may provide informal
feedback verbally to an employee. Future research could investigate whether these types
of informal feedback are less likely to influence employee time segmenting processes.
Another interesting avenue for future research would be to examine whether the feedback
contains information about the number of efficiencies found in addition to employee
output. This may be a potential intervention that would allow managers to provide
feedback on a more frequent basis without the accompanying negative effects of
decreased efficiency finding. Compensation timing is another organizational factor that
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seems likely to influence time segmenting. Employees who are paid weekly may break
up their work horizons differently than employees who are paid bi-weekly or monthly.
Future research could investigate how compensation design choices influence time
segmenting and whether compensation choices interact with feedback choices to
influence the segmenting process.
With regards to RPI, opportunities for future research exist. For example,
gamification—as a way of motivating employees to increase productivity—is becoming
increasing popular and many types of gamification include RPI as a way of making the
game competitive (Silverman 2011; Manjoo 2014). It would be interesting to examine
whether “gamifying” RPI or making it more “fun” would alleviate the negative effects of
RPI on discovering task efficiencies. Additionally, previous research has studied several
different types of RPI (e.g., public versus private, cumulative versus reset, rank versus
detailed) (Hannan et al. 2008; 2013; Tafkov 2013). Future research can examine whether
these variations in RPI reporting have an impact on productive effort and the discovery of
task efficiencies.
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